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Abstract.   The aim of the study was to compare students in a control group (n = 45) with those 
in a treatment group (n = 29) with respect to evaluative comments on psychological accounts of 
motivation.  The treatment group systematically scrutinized the nature and interpretation of 
evidence that supported different accounts, and the assumptions, logic, coherence and clarity of 
accounts.  Content analysis of 74 scripts (using three categories) showed that the control group 
students made more assertions than either evidential or evaluative points, whereas the treatment 
group used evaluative statements as often as they used assertion.  The findings provide support 
for privileging activities that develop understanding of how knowledge might be contested, and 
suggest a need for further research on pedagogies to serve this end. The idea is considered that 
such understanding has a pivotal role in the development of critical thinking (Kuhn, 1999, King 
& Kitchener, 1994).   
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Introduction 
Current advocacy of the idea that constructivist accounts of learning (Piaget 1977, Vygotsky 
1978) provide powerful theoretical frameworks for instruction (Salomon & Perkins, 1998, 
McGuinness 1999, Shayer & Adey 2002), implies that it is important to understand how students 
might learn to evaluate knowledge they study.  A central tenet of these constructivist accounts is 
that learning is an active restructuring of knowledge by learners that is provoked when they 
interpret experiences as dissonant with their current understandings.    This tenet implies that 
students need to learn to construct and deploy criteria, such as available evidence, in making 
judgements about whatever they study. These processes often are included in the term critical 
thinking. Kuhn’s (1991) description of critical thinking includes being able to: (a) separate 
beliefs from evidence; (b) imagine beliefs alternative to one’s own and to know what evidence 
would support these; (c) provide evidence which supports one’s own beliefs while rebutting the 
alternatives; (d) to weigh up reasons for believing what is alleged to be known.  Thus, Kuhn 
implies that students need to learn to restructure knowledge in the light of criteria.  
That such thinking seems to be poorly achieved has been attributed in part to its poor 
delineation in interventions (Kuhn, 1999).  Livingston et al (2003) reported that, often, the term 
critical thinking is used to describe whatever thinking processes the researchers wanted students 
to learn, such as analysing and articulating concepts, sorting through ideas, connecting thoughts, 
constructing and reflecting on ideas, constructing courses of action from analyses and 
hypothetical-deductive thinking.  Often referred to as cognitive skills, these processes appear in 
the many theoretical frameworks that purport to describe thinking (Moseley et al. in press), and 
were the focus of the vast majority of interventions reviewed by Livingston et al.  As Moseley et 
al point out, some frameworks include almost every known cognitive process, on the basis of 
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evidence that it is difficult to think critically about any task without deploying processes that 
often have been considered more basic, such as memory skills for organising information 
meaningfully. 
It has been argued that cognitive skills training is unlikely to lead to significant and 
sustainable progress with thinking unless it is accompanied by measures that help students to 
challenge their assumptions about the nature of knowledge and how it is gained (King & 
Kitchener 1994, Kuhn, 1999, King, 2000, Palmer & Marra, 2003).   These assumptions and their 
sequence of development are described in King & Kitchener’s (1994) Reflective Judgement 
Model, which describes three broad levels of epistemic development that reflect different beliefs 
about knowledge and how it is constructed.  People who reason at a pre-reflective level believe 
that knowledge is certain, that knowledge from good authorities is right, that justification is 
about showing that one’s own beliefs are right and that this is achieved by simply stating them, 
whereas those who attain either of the two higher levels (quasi-reflective and reflective 
reasoning) understand that knowledge is contestable rather than absolute, and that rules of 
inquiry for the context can be invoked for establishing the veracity of knowledge claims.  
Although critical thinking probably depends on the execution of many cognitive 
processes (Halpern 1997), some writers argue that cognitive skills training cannot be expected to 
bring about critical thinking unless the training invokes criteria for evaluating knowledge 
(Lipman 1991, Kuhn 1999).  The central idea in Lipman’s (1991, p.116) definition of critical 
thinking, that it is thinking ‘that can be assessed by appeal to criteria’ illuminates what students 
need to learn if they are to progress beyond the restrictive pre-reflective level of epistemological 
reasoning described in King & Kitchener’s (1994) Reflective Judgement Model.   King (2000) 
reported that, although very few college students attain fully reflective levels of thinking, some 
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students can use rules of enquiry to examine claims, a central feature of quasi-reflective thinking.  
However, King reports that those in courses with a vocational orientation, such as the teacher 
education course that is the focus of the present study, are less likely to achieve quasi-reflective 
thinking.  Since both King (2000) and Kuhn (1999) argue that improvements in thinking are 
likely to be insignificant until students change their epistemological assumptions, the present 
study seeks to influence such change by helping students to use constructs that are helpful in 
forming rules of enquiry.  
Concern that thinking aims are not being achieved has prompted spates of educational 
interventions designed to identify instructional practices that encourage such thinking (for a 
recent evaluation of interventions see Livingston et al. 2003).  As Livingston et al. (2003) noted, 
there have been few rigorously evaluated interventions that have sought to develop abilities 
connected with the epistemological reasoning described by King & Kitchener (1994) and by 
Kuhn (1991, 1999). A notable exception was Jones & Merrit’s (1999) TALESSI (Teaching and 
Learning at the Environment-Science-Society Interface) Project, which indicated that 
undergraduates could be moved towards a critical epistemology. Jones & Merrit’s (1999) 
approach focused on teaching the means to question and reveal the contestable character of 
knowledge claims about environmental questions, and this was directed toward constructing 
knowledge bases, on the grounds that important differences between experts and novices lie in 
the quality of their knowledge (e.g. Hoffman 1998).  Activities to promote these ends were built 
into the redesign of curricula.  However, the evaluation of the project focused on teachers’ views 
of the redesigned curricula rather than on quantifying the incidence of targeted aspects of 
thinking in students’ writing, as does the present study.  
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Lawson et al’s (2000) findings from a rigorous evaluation of a programme that was 
designed to promote the development of the ability to raise and answer a set of questions before 
drawing a firm conclusion about the relative truth or falsity of any particular causal claim 
suggest that there are benefits in this precise operationalizing of a critical epistemology.  
Students learned to handle questions about what alternative causes were possible, in addition to 
the proposed cause, about how each possibility could be tested, and about how the evidence, 
once gathered, matched the expectations.  Lawson et al’s (2000) findings support their claim that 
students were able not only to use this form of thinking in the classes in which it was taught but 
were able also to transfer the form of thinking within the domain of science.  They claim that the 
approach promoted concept construction and thereby helped students to construct a knowledge 
base in science, and that students used the approach competently on the course examinations 
covering a wide range of theoretical topics.  Given the scarcity of evidence that what is learned 
in one context transfers to others (Haskell 2001), these findings provide powerful support for 
privileging activities that develop understanding of how knowledge might be contested. 
  Taken together, the findings outlined above provide grounds for the present modest 
intervention, which focuses on learning to use appropriate constructs to carry out a rudimentary 
evaluation of psychological perspectives.  By avoiding looser definition of thinking used in many 
interventions reviewed by Livingston et al, it was hoped to maintain an achievable and 
measurable student goal.  While generalisable results are the ultimate aim, it is important to 
emphasise that the study reported here did not have such lofty aims, partly because of the sample 
frame used and partly because of the authors’ desire to infuse the aims into existing curricula.  
While the authors acknowledge the strength of arguments against the inclusion of some kinds of 
theory in professional courses, and the complexity of relationships between theory and practice 
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(Rowlands 1999; Thomas 1997), they would want to emphasise that these are not the central 
concerns of this paper. Rather, their concern is the more modest one that students should not 
accept uncritically the ideas in content prescribed for their course.  Therefore, the aim was to 
evaluate an intervention designed to decrease the incidence of assertion and increase the 
incidence of evaluative comment in undergraduate writing about three psychological 
perspectives.  Specifically, the question to be answered is: 
To what extent are patterns of evaluating, asserting, and evidencing in an undergraduate 
assessment task in a teacher education course influenced by brief participation in an 
approach informed by critical thinking literature? 
 
The intervention that was evaluated 
The learning activities  
The authors tried out an approach to developing critical thinking (designated Approach A), based 
on systematic practice in using constructs included in many taxonomies of critical thinking (e.g. 
see Moseley et al. 2004) to question theoretical accounts of motivation.  This approach was tried 
with twenty-nine students during four slots, each lasting ninety minutes, in a second year module 
in a Bachelor's degree in Primary Education that focused on three theoretical frameworks 
(Applied Behavioural Analysis, Cognitive Behaviourism and Humanism), with an emphasis on 
the contribution of these frameworks to understanding classroom behaviour.  A non-treatment 
control group from the same cohort spent the same time in tutorial activities described below that 
had been used for several years, designated Approach B. Thus, Approach B can be described as 
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an unchanged pedagogy condition.  Approach A and Approach B had a common aim: to enable 
students to critique the psychological ideas they were studying. 
In Approach A, the students about the following constructs and their use in forming  
questions about the three perspectives they studied: 
 
• assumptions  
• coherence and clarity  
• nature of evidence  
• interpretation of evidence 
• generalizations  
 
Following Bensley (1998), the students practised using the constructs (assumptions etc) in 
relation to the module content and to possible responses to children’s behaviour. In general, 
Approach A incorporated pedagogical principles discussed in Salomon and Perkins, (1998). 
In Approach B, instead of building in systematic practice in using the above constructs, 
the tutorials were loosely structured around questions about what might be incomplete or 
problematic in the account provided by each perspective, and tutors facilitated students’ attempts 
to comment critically on the module content.  This can be contrasted with Approach A, where 
the tutors explicitly and systematically asked students to examine assumptions, coherence, 
clarity, evidence and its interpretation, and justifiable generalisations, all in relation to the 
module content.   
Both Approach A and Approach B tutorials included discussion of the same assessment 
criteria, both the control and treatment group attended two lectures, and before each tutorial 
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meeting all the students completed prescribed reading (from Porter 2000), which included a 
chapter that introduced the targeted constructs.  In both approaches the students engaged in 
discussion in small groups and tutors chaired plenary sessions. 
The following is a typical activity in Approach A: 
Students were asked to discuss their responses to the following questions about an article they 
had read: 
• What was the author's purpose in writing the article?   
(for example to report on an empirical study, to examine an  
issue critically or what?) 
• What are the author's main findings or conclusions? 
• What evidence does the author offer in support of these findings? 
• Might there be better evidence for the findings?  If so what would that be like? 
• Might there be other ways of explaining the findings? 
• What, if anything, does the author seem to assume about the nature of children, the nature 
of discipline and the role of the teacher.  To what extent do you agree with these 
assumptions?   
• How far might the authors’ conclusions be generalized? 
 
The assessment task 
All students enrolled on the module (n = 74) wrote a response to the following question, but only 
responses to Part c of the question were used as research data: 
 
a. Provide a brief account of Applied Behavioural Analysis (ABA). 
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b. Comment on how ABA helps you to understand the behaviour of children. 
c. Consider in what ways this account is incomplete. 
 
Method 
Research Design 
A quasi-experimental design was employed on an opportunity sample of one cohort of students. 
The study compared post-treatment patterns of evaluating, asserting and evidencing by a 
treatment group and an untreated control group. Evidence of the effectiveness of such 
interventions (Bereiter, 2002) is slender enough to suppose that students in a control group 
would not be disadvantaged by non-participation in the intervention.   
Participants 
A cohort of seventy-four (74) students (64 female and 10 male) who were registered for a 
Bachelor's degree in Primary Education (a professional qualification with a license to practice), 
and who were enrolled on the targeted module, were randomly allocated to the treatment group 
(n = 29 and a control group (n = 45).   The pedagogical treatment consisted of Approach A, 
described above. The control group students were not exposed to any changes in pedagogy.  This 
no-change pedagogy is described above as Approach B.   
 
Data/Data analysis 
The data consisted of responses written under examination conditions to Part c of the assessment 
task described above. Since there was little variation in the responses to Parts a and b of the 
assessment task, which did not invite a substantially analytical response, they were not coded.  
However, given posited connections between knowledge and thinking in many taxonomies of 
 10
thinking (Moseley et al.), the authors looked at responses to Parts a and b to check that 
evaluation had not been impeded by inability to recall module content. 
Following Tesch (1990), the unit of analysis was a segment of text that is comprehensible 
by itself and contains one idea, episode or piece of information.  The development of the 
categories was guided by both literature on critical thinking (outlined earlier in this paper) and 
the data itself.  The procedure used in developing the system involved iteration between 
literature and data, following a process described by Anderson et al. (2001), and which involved 
a research assistant as well as the authors.  The category system was revised and developed 
through this process of iteration until agreement was reached on a set of codes.  The research 
assistant used the final category system to code all assignments.  Cronbach’s alpha was used to 
calculate the reliability of the coding scheme.  The results indicated that the coding could be 
carried out reliably over a two-week period.  (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.70).    
The final set of codes was as follows.   Further examples of statements allocated to codes 
are presented in the discussion section of the paper. 
1.  ‘Evaluates’ assertions or evidence 
To be counted as evaluative, statements must match any one of the following indicators: 
•       Discusses assumptions in views cited. 
• Comments on logic, coherence, clarity of views cited. 
• Considers the nature of the evidence, e.g. reliability, validity, generalisability, 
different possible interpretations of evidence, what agenda might be served by 
evidence/the extent to which the evidence is from a reliable, disinterested source, 
discusses the extent to which significant evidence is absent. 
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• Cites an alternative explanations of phenomena discussed, considers limitations of   
explanations, and what any account explains well.  
• Considers adequacy of inferences from evidence. 
Sample statement in this category:   
Thinking is missing from ABA accounts, which makes them incomplete because 
other accounts of learning, such as attribution, provide evidence of that there is a 
link between how children think about reasons for their success and failure and 
their achievement. 
 
2.  ‘Asserts’ – an opinion that is not supported by any kind of evidence, or by any 
reference to the indicators set out above for ‘Evaluates’ statements, or by reasoned 
argument: 
Sample statement:   
ABA is an incomplete account because all children are different. 
 
3.  ‘Evidences ’ – something offered to support assertions  
Any point of view or empirical finding which is attributed either to a publicly available 
source such as an acknowledged authority, a journal article, book, or newspaper, or is 
said to be based on placement experience; it is presented as a reason for believing that an 
adjacent assertion might be valid.  The difference between Evaluates and Evidences is 
that Evidence statements simply recite evidence without commentary, whereas Evaluates 
statements comment on the evidence in a way that matches one of the indicators set out 
above.  
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Sample evidence statement:  
… during my third placement in school (or alternatively, according to McGrath) 
there were improvements in behaviour in children who were on an ABA 
programme. 
 
Results 
Tables 1 and 2 below show that there are some differences in the pattern of responses for the 
control and treatment groups.  Differences between categories are significant at least to the level 
of p < 0.05, but some are significant at the more stringent level of p < 0.001.  The control group 
scores are presented in Table 1 below: 
 
Please insert Table 1 about here 
 
The significant differences that emerged between categories (F2,88 = 84.74, p < 0.001) for 
the control group data (Table 1) were followed-up by Bonferroni t-tests, which indicated that 
there were significantly more statements coded as Asserts (Category 2) than statements coded as 
either Evaluates (Category 1) or Evidences (Category 3), but there was no significant difference 
between the amount of statements coded as Evaluates and Evidences (Categories 1 and 3).  
Table 2 below shows the post-treatment test scores. 
 
Please insert Table 2 about here 
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The significant difference that emerged between categories (F2,56 = 6.75, p < 0.01) for the 
treatment group data (Table 2) was followed-up by Bonferroni t-tests, which indicated that there 
were no significant differences between the number of statements coded as Evaluates (Category 
1) and statements coded as Asserts (Category 2).  Tables 1 and 2 show that there were no 
significant differences between the amount of evaluation and evidence statements written by 
students in either the treatment or control group, although the means for the treatment group 
exceed those of the control group for both these categories.    
 
Discussion  
Overview 
All that the authors claim is that, on a part of a task that asked specifically for evaluation, 
the control group students asserted (mean = 10.18) four times as often as they appealed to criteria 
(mean = 2.53), whereas the treatment group did not assert (mean = 5.69) significantly more often 
than they evaluated knowledge (mean = 4.00).   This main finding can be related to Kuhn’s 
(1999) discussion of Lipman’s (1991, p.116) point that critical thinking is thinking that can be 
assessed by appeal to criteria.   There are grounds for connecting the results with the pedagogy, 
in that the criteria most commonly used by the treatment group were ones that had been formed 
from the constructs that had been taught in Approach A.   Since the only student statements that 
were coded were the ones written in response to a request to say ‘what is incomplete’ about a 
particular perspective, it might be inferred that the more explicit and systematic approach in the 
treatment group tutorials had greater impact on students’ grasp of criteria for addressing this 
question.  During tutorials, students in both the control and treatment groups discussed the need 
to weigh up evidence for their views, and were informed in writing that evaluative statements 
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would be rewarded through higher grades.  Therefore, the findings suggest the different 
assertion/evaluation patterns in the two groups do not simply reflect ignorance of what was 
valued by the assessors. but a firmer grasp by the treatment groups students of appropriate means 
of enquiry to contest the ideas they were studying. 
Although modest, the improvement in the treatment group is not trivial if it is considered 
in the light of themes that pervades the literature: the difficulty in bringing about any 
improvement of thinking (Lawson et al. (2000) and the scarcity of evidence of transfer of what 
has been learned from one context to another, such as the transfer from tutorial work to the 
examination in the present study (Haskell, 2001).    Moreover, these differences arose at the end 
of an intervention that was much shorter than is usually reported and which can be easily 
embedded into higher education teaching.  However, it is important to highlight some limitations 
of this type of study. 
First, there are problematic assumptions in any categorization system that is used to 
quantify differences in the incidence of types of statements that students write. Definitions of 
categories developed from a different body of research for the three categories (evaluates, asserts 
and evidences) might have produced a different pattern of results.  In the present study the 
definitions used are ones that describe forms of thinking that are thought to be important in the 
discipline (psychology) that the students studied (Bensley 1998), as well as in many scientific 
disciplines (Lawson et al. 2000).  In future research, there is a case for taking into account the 
distinction that Keefer (1996) made between practical arguments and theoretical arguments, and 
his point that different standards are appropriate for judging practical arguments.    
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Second, many unknown variables may have influenced performance in both groups.  
Although Approach A included much more systematic practice on aspects of critical thinking, as 
is the case in similar studies, it is difficult to isolate the effect of such practice from other 
variables, particularly since there was no dialogue analysis of interaction during tutorial sessions. 
It is possible too that students in the treatment group shared their understandings with their peers 
in the control group.  While it would have been unethical to discourage such sharing, it is 
possible that it did attenuate differences between the groups.  Like most studies of its type, it is 
open to a fundamental objection that differences in post-tutorial reading and reflection 
contributed to the different pattern of statements in the two groups.   
A closer look at the main finding  
For the most part students invoked the adequacy of assumptions, the strengths and 
weaknesses in evidence and alternative interpretations of evidence.    In addressing the question 
of ‘what is incomplete’ the control group mainly asserted what they ‘felt’ about a perspective.  
Their responses were characterised by an absence of criteria.    The use of constructs learned in 
the treatment condition to form criteria can be illustrated by reference to the indicators listed in 
the Data/Data Analysis section; a match with any one indicator allowed a statement to be coded 
as evaluates.  An example of an attempt to use as a criterion the validity of assumptions appears 
in the following statements: 
ABA accounts assume that teachers have a right and responsibility to be in charge, but 
Humanists point out an alternative assumption is that students and teachers have equal 
rights to have their needs met but occupy different roles.  Thus, not all research shares 
the assumption in behaviour modification that it is ethically acceptable for adults to 
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decide what are desirable behaviours for children.  We need to judge it against our own 
and others’ ideas about ethics.  
The statements coded as evaluates reflect thinking that has some resemblance to a critical 
epistemology (Perkins 1989) in that these students seem to be trying to consider possible 
objections to ideas they have encountered in their module, whereas ones coded as Asserts are 
closer to Perkins’ description of a makes-sense epistemology, in that they assert, but do not 
consider if their assertion stands up to scrutiny.  Rather they go straight on to consider practices 
that flow from their assertion: students who asserted (with no evidence) that ‘all children are 
different’ went on to advocate classroom practices that reflected this belief.  They did not 
question what the differences might be, or consider why they should believe that these 
differences existed.  Nor did they refer to the practical possibility of implementing the practices 
they advocated to deal with the supposed differences.   Like the adults in Kuhn’s (1991) sample, 
they seemed to be thinking with a personal theory but not about this theory, since there were no 
adjacent statements that suggested enquiry into its veracity.  This can be contrasted with the 
treatment group’s propensity to raise possible objections as often as asserting views.  For 
example, they raised objections in statements such as:  
Behaviourists argue that it’s not worth considering thinking processes but my 
placement experience suggests that if a teacher does not ask children to talk about how 
they thought their way through a problem she does not know enough about the 
children’s difficulties to help them. 
I tried to apply ideas from Humanism in my last placement but it was hard to say how 
they should be interpreted in the classroom because they’re so woolly and slippery. 
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What emerges from closer inspection of the control group data is that many statements 
begin with an apparently evaluative intention, such as ‘Cognitive Behaviourism is better than 
Humanism’.   However, the statement is completed by simply stating an opinion, unaccompanied 
by evidence or reasoning, implying that students believed that opinion alone was a sufficient 
justification.  In King & Kitchener’s (1994) Model of Reflective Judgement, such responses are 
characterised as pre-reflective thinking because they do not invoke rules of inquiry for the 
context.  While the control group students asserted much more often than they evaluated or 
evidenced, attempts to evaluate psychological knowledge by weighing up evidence and querying 
assumptions were not missing altogether from the control group data.   
However, while the pattern of results in the treatment group can be interpreted as 
consistent with quasi-reflective reasoning in King & Kitchener’s (1994) Model of Reflective 
Judgement, these students sometimes used pre-reflective reasoning, such as simply stating their 
beliefs, as well as querying their veracity in appropriate ways.  Within each of King & 
Kitchener’s (1994) levels are stages.  They suggest that the reasoning of a less sophisticated 
stage continues as the reasoning of the next stage develops and manifests itself.  According to 
King & Kitchener (1994), at each stage the cognitive seeds of the next level are developing.  
Inspection of the treatment group data suggests that the pedagogy influenced some students more 
than others in this group to use rules of enquiry.  It is possible that those who evaluated less often 
might have benefited from a longer period of systematic instruction about appropriate enquiry 
constructs.   
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Incidence of evaluation in expert and undergraduate writing 
What might be a reasonable level of evaluative commentary in second year students’ 
assessment tasks in a programme that included activities to promote such thinking is difficult to 
judge because few other studies have defined and measured critical thinking in a similar way and 
in a similar population.  Anderson et al. (2001) used a similar category system to capture critical 
thinking in an intervention and reported means in three pieces of writing that ranged from 1.07 to 
1.7 for evidence statements but found no evaluative statements in their data.  In a study that 
allocated PGCE students’ writing to categories that included critical reflection, Maclellan (1999) 
allocated only two out of her twenty-five samples of writing to this category, with the others 
falling into descriptive categories.  Maclellan’s indicators of critical reflection were similar to 
those used in the present study to allow statements to be coded as evaluates. Overall, the 
treatment group students in the present study constructed more evaluative statements than those 
in either of the other two studies.   
What might be regarded as typical expert levels of competence in writing evaluative 
statements was assessed by coding a critique of Cognitive Behaviourism from the text used by 
the students (Porter 2000), using the same category system.  Almost all the statements were 
allocated to the evaluates and evidences codes.  As would be predicted by expert/novice research 
(e.g. Hoffman 1998), the students in both groups fell far short of this level.  It might be helpful 
for students to practise identifying how the author of a critique questions assumptions and 
weighs up evidence. However, the paucity of students’ knowledge also hampered their attempts 
at evaluation.  For example, many students erroneously imagined that Applied Behaviour 
Analysis could not work because ‘it does not allow for involving parents’, whereas others had 
read enough to understand that consistency in the use of this approach ‘inside and outside 
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school’ is important. Many writers argue that knowledge and thinking are intimately connected 
(Bonnett 1995; Gardner & Johnson 1996).  Reasons for believing that appropriate forms of 
thinking arise from sound knowledge of a domain, such as psychology, have been well rehearsed 
by Hirschfeld & Gelman (1994). The literature provides sound reasons for supposing that, although 
the students’ responses to the other parts of the assessment task suggested that they had basic 
knowledge of the perspectives studied, the impact of Approach A might have been attenuated by 
insufficient student reading.   
 
Implications 
 The findings are consistent with Bensley’s (1998) claim that sustained, systematic 
practice in weighing up underlying assumptions, coherence and quality of supporting and 
conflicting evidence in prescribed reading is a promising way of helping students to think 
critically about what they are studying (Bensley 1998).  Plainly, substantial assessment credit has 
to be given for engaging in such scrutiny.  The approach seems to have potential for disturbing 
students’ beliefs  that knowledge is absolute and entirely a matter of opinion, and for providing 
some conceptual tools for acting on this understanding.   Nevertheless, the modest differences 
imply that a mindset might exist, such as that described by Perkins’ (1989) makes-sense 
epistemology, that will take more to change than the measures adopted in this study.   Livingston 
et al’s (2003) conclusions support a belief that more substantial progress might have been 
achieved if students had practised similar aspects of thinking across the curriculum.  
 The fact that students in the control group predominantly reasoned in ways that are 
consistent with the most limited ‘pre-reflective’ level in King & Kitchener’s (1994) Model of 
Reflective Judgement suggests that much more systematic measures are required across the 
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curriculum to ensure that students constantly bring to bear on their course content the sort of 
enquiry tools that were practised in the present study.   According to King (2000) pre-reflective 
thinking is a barrier to reflective judgement, and disadvantages teachers and other professionals 
who have to deal with ill-structured problems such as curriculum development and classroom 
management.  A critical epistemology (Perkins 1989) encapsulates thinking that seems to have 
professional utility in that in implies that people understand the pitfalls of justification and try to 
test their arguments against possible objections.  It might be supposed that those who think about 
their practice in this way are likely to be thorough in their evaluation of innovations proposed by 
themselves or others.   
According to King and Kitchener (1994), to be deemed capable of fully reflective 
thinking (rather than quasi-reflective) students must provide evidence of interrelating 
considerations such as the explanatory value of a perspective, the strength of evidence that 
supports it and the practical possibility of working with the perspective.  This level of thinking 
seems likely to be promoted by studying rigorously a range of disciplinary perspectives, since it 
is difficult to entertain such considerations in the absence of some knowledge of alternative 
explanations, and the arguments that underpin them.   The ability to interrelate psychological and 
sociological explanations of the educational difficulties that children in disadvantaged 
communities sometimes experience would be a step towards fully reflective thinking. How such 
progress might be achieved is well illustrated in the Jones & Merrit intervention, but requires 
institutional changes that were beyond the scope of the present study.   Although King & 
Kitchener’s (1994) model leaves questions to be resolved about how individuals progress 
through the stages and about the relationship between maturation, education and culture, the 
findings in the present study support the view that introducing learners to constructs that are 
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useful in making more reasoned judgments might help them to advance their epistemological 
understanding.  
 A good deal of research remains to be done on identifying a range of conditions that 
support the development of aspects of thinking (Zohar et al 2001, Browne & Freeman 2000).    
These questions seem to be worth addressing if higher education is to enhance employability and 
citizenship, which seem to be well served by a capacity to arrive at reasoned judgments by 
weighing up evidence in the light of multiple and often conflicting criteria, and by a growing 
understanding that knowledge is neither entirely objective and certain, nor is it simply a matter of 
opinion.   
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Table I Control group test scores:  Mean number of statements in each  
of the three categories and standard deviations (SD) 
Description of 
Category 
Category 
Number 
Mean (n=45) S.D. 
Evaluates 1 2.53a 2.19 
Asserts 2 10.18b 5.25 
Evidences 3 1.71a 2.06 
 
Table II  Post-treatment test scores:  Mean number of statements in each of the three categories 
 
Description of 
Category  
Category 
Number 
Mean (n=29) S.D. 
Evaluates 1 4.00ab 2.02 
Asserts 2 5.69a 4.76 
Evidences 3 2.66b 3.47 
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